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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(j). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), the Utah Supreme Court poured this matter
over to this Court on May 23,2007. The Utah Supreme Court initially had jurisdiction of this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Cross-Appellants ("Eaglebrook") state the issues and standards of review.
Issue I:

Whether the trial court erred in not awarding a reasonable amount of
attorney fees to Eaglebrook when the trial court found that attorney fees
were proper.

Standards of Review: Whether the non-award of attorneys' fees to Eaglebrook was
reasonable will be considered under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,991 (Utah 1988). Eaglebrook preserved this issue in its Response to
Plaintiffs' Objections to Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. 250), and
in oral argument on the motion.
Issue II:

Whether Eaglebrook should be awarded reasonable attorney fees
incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's appeal and Eaglebrook's cross appeal.

Standard of Review: None. The appellate court shall award just damages for a
frivolous appeal. Utah R. App. P. 33(a). In addition, Utah Dept of Social Services v. Adams,
806 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1991) states that "[t]he general rule is that when a party who
received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably
1

incurred on appeal."
Cross-Appellants ("Eaglebrook") state that any other issues addressed by opposing
counsel in its Response Brief of Cross-Appellee Pacificorp are not before this court and
should not be considered in this appeal.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56, Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in
bad faith -- Exceptions,
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to
a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except
under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees
against a party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action
before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under
the provisions of Subsection (1).
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a) & (b). Damages for delay or frivolous appeal;
recovery of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34,
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted
by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass,
2

cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit
only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
Utah Dept of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1991).
"The general rule is that when a party who received attorney fees below
prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on
appeal." (Citations omitted).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The main issue before the lower court was whether PacifiCorp has an easement over
property owned by Eaglebrook and, if so, its location. For years, PacifiCorp has used a dirt
road leading to its Winchester Hills' Substation. Subsequently, R.C. Tolman, president of
Eaglebrook, paved a new road to his house which is located near the substation; R.C. Tolman
considered this road his private driveway. Once the road was paved, PacifiCorp's vehicles
began using this paved road as their primary sub-station access; however, Mr. Tolman
objected to the use of his private driveway and asserts that this is not the intended easement.
On April 1,2005, PacifiCorp filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
a Motion for Temporary and Preliminary Restraining Order and a Supporting Memorandum
with the intent of forcing R.C. Tolman/Eaglebrook into providing PacifiCorp access to its
Winchester Hills' Substation over this new paved road. PacifiCorp failed to serve the
Complaint or Motion for Preliminary Injunction on Eaglebrook Corporation or R.C. Tolman.
A Hearing was held fourteen days later; however, neither Eaglebrook Corporation or R.C.
Tolman were notified of this hearing nor aware of the same. As a result, the lower court
3

issued an unopposed Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction against Eaglebrook
recognizing temporarily an easement which included this paved road. Mr. Tolman later
received service of the Order on the Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction. It was the
first actual notice he had of any action against Eaglebrook.
Thereafter, Eaglebrook demanded that PacifiCorp prove service which it could never
do. Though PacifiCorp withdrew the Injunction, it did not withdraw the case. It was obvious
to Eaglebrook that PacifiCorp liked its position of power and continued to put Eaglebrook
off, dragging the case on and on despite being unwilling to prove service, or for that matter,
even serve the initiating pleadings on the Defendant. PacifiCorp did not take the simple step
of withdrawing the case and refiling, but instead persisted in advancing an improperly
formed case recognizing the significant power it held over Eaglebrook as Eaglebrook could
not join the case properly. Eaglebrook realized it was not in a fair position to negotiate and
the case could not be furthered without any service and due process. It was obvious that
PacifiCorp had all the power under these conditions and continued to seek to keep it that
way. Without service, Eaglebrook could not answer or even move the court to dismiss.
Finally, after two years of unnecessary litigation, PacifiCorp's Complaint and Motion
for Preliminary Injunction was dismissed after it was clear PacifiCorp could not prove
service and Defendants moved the court to dismiss, despite not yet being officially part of
the litigation.
Eaglebrook has asked that a reasonable amount of attorney fees be awarded for the
4

lower court case. Eaglebrook has also asked for an award of attorney fees incurred as a result
of the Appeal filed by PacifiCorp, given PacifiCorp's continuous abuses of procedure.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On April 1,2005, PacifiCorp filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive

Relief, a Motion for Temporary and Preliminary Restraining Order and a Supporting
Memorandum. (R. 1-28). This Complaint and Motion pertained to an easement which
allowed PacifiCorp access to its Winchester Hills' Substation. The issue before the court
was which road PacifiCorp should be allowed to use for access to its Substation.
2.

On April 14,2005, a Hearing was held on PacifiCorp's Motion for Temporary

and Preliminary Restraining Order.

(R. 29). PacifiCorp was present at the hearing.

Eaglebrook, who had not been served, was not. The Court entered a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining and restraining Eaglebrook from blocking the access road.
3.

On August 9,2005, Eaglebrook's president, R.C. Tolman, was only served the

Temporary Restraining Order; however, there is no proof of service in the court file. (See
lower court file.) PacifiCorp has never proved timely service of the Complaint.
4.

On February 24, 2006, Eaglebrook requested an award of attorney fees in its

Petition to Set Aside Preliminary Injunction. (R. 47).
5.

On August 29, 2006, Eaglebrook requested an award of attorney fees in its

Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 139-140).
6.

On November 16,2006, Eaglebrook requested an award of attorney fees at the
5

Hearing for its Motion for Summary Judgment, which the court, by its language, changed to
a Motion to Dismiss. R. 306 at p. 9-10).
7.

On February 12,2007, Eaglebrook requested an award of attorney fees at the

Hearing for PacifiCorp's Objections to Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment. (R. 307 at p. 19-22).
8.

On December 27,2006, an Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Request for Fees

and Costs was filed. The total cumulative amount of all attorney fees was $17,358.00 and
the total amount of costs was $427.97. (R. 221).
9.

On March 22,2007, the lower court signed the Order on Defendants' Motion

for Summary Judgment, dismissing the case. The lower court's Order stated "an award of
attorney fees and costs is proper", (R. 280); "[t]his Court has identified those fees and costs
it deems reasonably related to the improper actions of the Plaintiff and sets forth the total
amount of those fees and costs awarded below" (R. 280-281); however, the court awarded
costs but did not place a dollar value to the award of attorney fees. (R. 281).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Awarding a Reasonable Amount
of Attorney Fees to Eaglebrook Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
PacifiCorp argues the lower court did not intend to award attorney fees; however, the

lower court's ruling does not support PacifiCorp's argument. The lower court, in reviewing
the lower court's comments in context, clearly reevaluated its consideration of awarding

6

attorney fees and took the issue under advisement at the last hearing. Thereafter, in the lower
court's Order, it stated "an award of attorney fees and costs is proper," (R. 280), and stated
"[t]he Court has identified those fees and costs it deems reasonably related to the improper
actions of the Plaintiff and set forth the total amount of those fees and costs awarded below."
(R. 280-281). The lower court did not place a dollar value for attorney fees in the Order;
instead, it placed a line where the amount of attorney fees awarded should be placed.
Further, the court did not explain why a reasonable amount of attorney fees was not awarded
when it was clear that attorney fees were incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's abusive actions
and inactions.
PacifiCorp argues the lower court's Order that "an award of attorney fees and costs
is proper" was error; however, PacifiCorp did not preserve this argument for appeal.
PacifiCorp did not file a Motion for Reconsideration or preserve this issue on appeal. The
language of the Order is now the law of the case. The issue before the court is not whether
attorney fees are proper as PacifiCorp asserts wrongly, but whether the lower court erred or
abused its discretion by not awarding a reasonable amount of attorney fees.
PacifiCorp argues the lower court did not find bad faith; however, the lower court's
ruling supports a general finding of bad faith in stating that an award of attorney fees was
proper. The finding of bad faith should be considered to the degree that it affects the amount
of attorney fees to be awarded taking into consideration the abusive and unconscionable
actions of PacifiCorp. The lower court found that "an award of attorney fees and costs is

7

proper" (R. 280); this is the law of the case. One must conclude that the lower court
determined that PacifiCorp's actions rose to the level of a general finding of bad faith. This
is uncontested, as PacifiCorp has failed to preserve any right to object to the Order's
language. PacifiCorp's abusive and unconscionable actions must now be acknowledged.
The only remaining issue is the reasonable amount of attorney fees that should be awarded
in this case.
PacifiCorp argues that if the appeals court determines that a reasonable amount of
attorney fees should be awarded, then, PacifiCorp suggests a nominal fee. This is not the
standard. The appeals court should instruct the lower court to consider all of the attorney
fees that were reasonably incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's abusive and unconscionable
actions. If the case is remanded, the appeals court should instruct the lower court to take into
consideration the two years of fees incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's abusive and
unconscionable actions, which equates to nearly the entirety of fees incurred.
II.

EAGLEBROOK IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER THEIR ATTORNEY'S FEES
INCURRED ON APPEAL.
PacifiCorp argues that attorney fees on appeal should only be awarded if the lower

court awards attorney fees. Eaglebrook should indeed receive attorney fees on appeal if the
lower court awards attorney fees. In addition, Eaglebrook should also receive attorney fees
based upon Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a) & (b) for the frivolous appeal PacifiCorp
filed and its subsequent abusive and unconscionable actions on appeal.

8

ARGUMENT
There are two narrow issues before this court. The two issues are: 1) whether the trial
court erred in not awarding a reasonable amount of attorney fees to Eaglebrook when it found
that attorney fees were proper; and 2) whether Eaglebrook should be awarded reasonable
attorney fees incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's appeal and Eaglebrook's cross appeal.
Any other red herring issues addressed by opposing counsel in its Response Brief Of
Cross-Appellee are improper and not before this court. These must not be considered in this
appeal as they have not been adequately preserved.
Accordingly, Eaglebrook replies to PacifiCorp's Response Brief as follows:
I.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Awarding a Reasonable
Amount of Attorney Fees to Eaglebrook Pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §
78-27-56.

The lower court, in its Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, stated
that "an award of attorney fees and costs is proper." (R. 280). This is the law of the case.
The lower court, however, did not make clear as to what amount of attorney's fees was
reasonable in this case.
A.

PacifiCorp argues the lower court did not intend to award attorney fees;
however, the lower court's ruling does not support PacifiCorp's
argument

Arguing against the clear language of the final Order, PacifiCorp argues in its
Response Brief of Cross-Appellee that the lower court did not intend to award attorney fees.
PacifiCorp cited a segment of an oral hearing on February 12,2007, wherein the lower court
9

states, "I believe the court would have not granted attorney fees..." (R. 307 at p. 1); however,
PacifiCorp fails to provide the appeals court with the subsequent argument presented to the
court by Eaglebrook and the subsequent comments made by the court. In other words, they
have quoted a comment made by the court before counsel for Eaglebrook had even made
substantive arguments.
To place the court's statements in context, the following is the discussion regarding
attorney fees that was before the lower court and the court's response:
Eaglebrook requested the award of attorney fees in its Petition to Set Aside
Preliminary Injunction accompanying memorandum filed on February 24, 2006. (R. 47).
Eaglebrook also requested the award of attorney fees in its Motion for Summary
Judgment filed on August 29, 2006, wherein it noted "Utah Code Annotated, 78-27-56(1),
states: "In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party
if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith..." (R. 139-140).
Eaglebrook requested the award of attorney fees at Eaglebrook's Motion for Summary
Judgment hearing on November 16, 2006. The judge, in the November 16, 2006 hearing
regarding the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Motion to Dismiss], noted:
THE COURT: The court, Mr. Graham, is going to grant the
motion to dismiss the preliminary injunction. Mr. Graham
and/or Mr. Rodriguez, if you'll go ahead and prepare an order
for the court, the court will go ahead and take a look at the
attorneyfees. And F11 go ahead and make a ruling with respect
10

to that.
MR. GRAHAM: Let me clarify, their complaint is for the
injunction, so we are dismissing the complaint, if I'm THE COURT: That's correct. That's correct. Anymore record,
Mr. Graham, or, Mr. Rodriguez, that you would like to make at
this time?
MR. GRAHAM: Just that we will be submitting attorney fees
and costs in camera for your review.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much....
(R. 306 at p. 9-10). (Emphasis added).
In response to the dismissal, PacifiCorp filed its Objections to Order on Defendants9
Motion for Summary Judgment on December 12,2006. (R. 173-176). A hearing was then
requested. (R. 192).
On February 12, 2007, the court heard PacifiCorp's Objections to Order on
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. At the hearing, PacifiCorp's counsel brought
up the issue of attorney fees. The court noted the following:
THE COURT: Mr. Rampton, frankly with respect to the issue of
attorney's fees, if you would have appeared on November 16th,
2005, or someone from your firm would have appeared, I doubt
very much, in fact, I believe the court would have not granted
attorney's fees. So, with respect to that issue, I think that's a
moot issue, because the court's going to set aside the court order
with respect to attorney's fees at this time. I just don't think I
would have awarded those at the time. So, I don't think you

11

need to argue that, counsel.
(R. 307 at p. 13).
PacifiCorp would have the Appeals Court stop reading at this point. The court, however, has
the full records and should continue reading. After the court made its comments to Mr.
Rampton, the court, then, gave Eaglebrook the opportunity to argue its position before the
court. Eaglebrook argued the following:
MR. GRAHAM: ... What should have happened is that once
recognizing they are out of the 120 days, rather than playing
dodgeball, they should have said, we recognize that this is not
properly framed. We are going to go ahead and refile this
matter because there is no prejudice to the parties. Instead, what
we had is an aggressive position taken by the plaintiffs which
caused, I might add, attorney fees, a lot of attorneys fees.
Because when you are playing dodgeball, you have to run
around a lot. And that's what we were playing. We didn't
know the rules that Mr. Ramptom was playing by. ...
(R. 307 at p. 19). (Emphasis added).
Later, in the February 12, 2007 hearing, Mr. Graham, again, brought up attorney fees. He
pleaded with the court to award attorney fees as you will note from the Hearing transcript:
MR. GRAHAM: ... The only thing that I would ask the court
to reconsider is addressing the attorney fees. Certainly, there
are things that we will benefitfrom in the second or subsequent
action. And, certainly, the court take its own discretion to
reduce that by things that we would benefit from. But there
were a lot of things that can not, will not be raised in the second
action. And those things were caused by the improper
advancement of this case causing us to be on our heels. Mr.
12

Rodriguez, himself, had to come down to the court and dig
through the file to find these documents to just get any
indication as to what was going on in this case. We literally
have acted in a vacuum, not being able to see or understand
what was going on. The activity of preparing for hearings that
we believed were going to summarily resolve the matter under
the issue of, hey, where is the service, which did not end up
resulting in that, but certainly were still raised. We still had to
unwind this case. The preliminary injunction motion was done
without any appearance on behalf of Mr. Tolman or his
company. That had to be unwound. The prejudice to the
defendant is evidenced in the writings themselves in the time
that is kept. And I would ask the detailed pleadings. We have
tried to get as detailed as we can. I would ask that the court look
at that and consider which items were caused by inappropriate
advancement of this case rather than simply saying on the very
first motion, Mr. Graham, you are right. In fact, they said that,
Your Honor, Mr. Graham, you are right. We are outside the
120. Excuse us. Let me just dismiss this action by stipulation
or by our own matter because we hadn't answered. They could
have easily just withdrawn the matter, re filed it appropriately
for 100 something dollars, then get the thing appropriately set.
Instead, they pushed andpushed andpushed. And that resulted
in attorney fees. I would ask the court to reconsider, examine
those billings if it would and make an award of attorney fees.
(R. 307 at p. 21-22). (Emphasis added).
Following Mr. Graham's pleading for attorney fees, the court gave Mr. Rampton the
opportunity to respond to Mr. Graham's comments. Mr. Rampton made what appears to be
a referral to attorney fees when he noted:
MR. RAMPTON:... Never was a motion to dismiss made until
the motion for summary judgment was filed. Never. And for
counsel to say that they incurred all of this expense and all of
this delay, they didn't. We were going forward with the case.
Everybody was going forward with the case, including the court.
13

The court was involved at that point. The court had made an
order. Counsel had stipulated to be bound by it.
(R. 307 at p. 24).
At the conclusion of the February 12, 2007 hearing, the court noted:
THE COURT: ...I've a pretty good idea how I am going to rule.
However, there are issue[s] of attorney's fees and the, also the
whole, well the whole issue with respect to jurisdiction and
whether or not proper form was followed in this case. ...
(R. 307 at p. 26).
Initially, the court may have considered not awarding attorney's fees; however, after
Mr. Graham had the opportunity to argue his position of the case and argue for attorney fees,
the court was clearly reconsidering the award of attorney fees at the end of all arguments.
To represent the record differently is to misrepresent the record. Fortunately, this court is not
limited to PacifiCorp's edited version of the proceedings.
Later, the lower court, in its Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed on March 22, 2007, stated that "an award of attorney fees and costs is proper." (R.
280). The lower court then specifically stated in its Order that "...the Court has identified
those fees and costs it deems reasonably related to the improper actions of the Plaintiff and
sets forth the total amount of those fees and costs awarded below" (R. 280-281). The trial
judge, then, in completing his Order, stated that "[t]his Court orders that an award of
reasonable attorney fees unnecessarily expended by the Defendants be awarded in the amount

14

of $

and costs of suit unnecessarily expended by the Defendants be awarded in

the amount of $427.97. The fees and costs shall be paid to the Defendants within thirty days
of the entry of this order." (R. 281). Despite a clear finding, the lower court failed to specify
an amount of attorney fees or record the reason for not awarding an amount of reasonable
attorney fees, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(2)(b), if that was its intent as there was
no affidavit of impecuniosity filed. It is painfully obvious that Eaglebrook incurred attorney
fees which were necessary to address PacifiCorp's Complaint & Motion for Injunction filed,
to address the improper Injunction awarded by the lower court, and to address the dismissal
of the case. It would be an obvious injustice to Eaglebrook to not award attorney fees in this
case; therefore, the lower court obviously erred or abused it discretion when it did not award
a reasonable amount of attorney fees. This action should have never advanced beyond the
fact of the untimely service. To the extent it did, PacifiCorp is responsible for fees and costs.
Eaglebrook further argues that if a Court finds that costs should be awarded in an
amount of $427.97, then, a reasonable amount of attorney fees should also be awarded. With
a finding that an award of attorney fees and costs is proper and considering the significant
number of attorney fees that Eaglebrook incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's failure to serve
its Complaint for Declaratory Injunctive Relief and its Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction and its subsequent actions, this court must remand the case
back to the lower court with instructions to award a reasonable amount of attorney fees to
Eaglebrook. Eaglebrook suggests the initial request of $17,358.00 plus interest from the

15

original Order date.
B.

PacifiCorp argues the lower court's Order that "an award of attorney fees
and costs is proper" was error; however, PacifiCorp did not preserve this
argument for appeal.

The lower court judge, in his Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement,
stated that "an award of attorney fees and costs is proper." (R. 280).
PacifiCorp had the opportunity to protest the lower court's ruling; however it did not.
PacifiCorp did not file a Motion for Reconsideration requesting that the lower court review
it Order on this matter. Furthermore, PacifiCorp did not preserve this argument on appeal.
Accordingly, the Order is binding on PacifiCorp. As such, whether "an award of
attorney fees and costs is proper", (R. 280), is not an appealable issue and is not before this
court.
C.

PacifiCorp argues the lower court did not find bad faith; however, the
lower court's ruling supports a general finding of bad faith in stating that
an award of attorney fees was proper. The finding of bad faith should be
considered to the degree that it affects the amount of attorney fees to be
awarded taking into consideration the abusive actions of PacifiCorp.

Following the review of this case and the case law submitted by counsel, the court
made its final determination. The trial court judge specifically found that "an award of
attorney fees and costs is proper" (R. 280), in this case. An award of attorney fees is proper
because of the unconscionable actions of PacifiCorp. PacifiCorp filed its Complaint for
Declaratory Injunctive Relief and its Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction on April 1, 2005. (R. 1-28). Unfortunately, PacifiCorp dragged the
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case on and on, delaying the case until it was dismissed on March 22, 2007, after being
unable to prove service. (R. 277-282). Almost two years of unnecessary litigation transpired.
As such, it is clear the order was based on the court's finding that "the Plaintiff did not take
the simple step of withdrawing this case, but persisted in advancing an improperly formed
case against good reason,... and caused the Defendants to defend in a void of pleadings and
proper procedure..." (R. 280). While the trial court did not use the specific language "bad
faith" in its ruling, the court did find that attorney fees and costs were proper in this case.
(R. 280).

The finding to justify such an award is necessarily based on bad faith.

PacifiCorp's motives are very suspect in this case, as there is absolutely no evidence that
PacifiCorp even attempted to serve its Complaint for Declaratory Injunctive Relief and its
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction on Eaglebrook. In
addition, there is absolutely no evidence that PacifiCorp made an attempt to provide Notice
to Eaglebrook of the Hearing on the Preliminary Injunction. Eaglebrook also made the court
aware of unconscionable delays and its persistent requests for PacifiCorp to prove service.
(R. 307 at p. 14). Eaglebrook explained to the court that PacifiCorp continually wanted to
press forward with the case without proving service or even making belated service. It was
further obvious that any attempt to negotiate an agreement between the parties would have
immediately placed PacifiCorp in an unconscionable advantage over Eaglebrook as long as
there was an Injunction in place - an Injunction that should have never been awarded
because the Complaint and Motion upon which the Injunction was based lacked proper
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service. Taking such facts in its totality, there is basis for the lower court to find bad faith.
Such facts should be taken into consideration by the lower court when awarding the amount
of attorney fees.
The court recognized after review of the facts and case law that the court had the right
to dismiss the case and award the appropriate attorney fees and costs. The court specifically
ruled that attorney fees and costs were proper in this case. The question then was what was
the reasonable amount of attorney fees that should be awarded under these circumstances and
facts.
D.

PacifiCorp argues that if the appeals court determines that a reasonable
amount of attorney fees should be awarded, then, PacifiCorp suggests a
nominal fee; however, the appeals court should instruct the lower court
to consider all of the attorney fees that were reasonably incurred as a
result of PacifiCorp's abusive and unconscionable actions.

Eaglebrook agrees that the appeals court should remand the case back to the lower
court to make a determination as to the amount of attorney fees to be awarded; however,
when remanding the case back to the lower court, the appeals court should instruct the lower
court that a reasonable amount of attorney fees should be awarded taking into consideration
the two years of fees incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's abusive and unconscionable actions.
It is Eaglebrook's position that the amount of attorney fees that Eaglebrook should be
awarded should be determined by the amount of unnecessary work that was done on this
case, such as, pursuing a Complaint and Motion which lacked process of service, asking the
Court for an Injunction without due process, the unconscionable and continual delays
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attributable to PacifiCorp, the misrepresentations of PacifiCorp, and for activity necessary
to dismiss the case. To be fair, the court should consider all attorney fees incurred starting
• from April 1,2005, when the first Complaint for Declaratory Injunctive Relief and its Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction was filed, (R. 1-28), and
consider all attorney fees incurred through March 22,2007, when the Complaint was finally
dismissed and the Injunction set aside. (R. 277-282). In reality, Eaglebrook's position was
not furthered during that period of time and very little was accomplished regarding the
easement which was the main issue of the Complaint. (R. 1-28). Eaglebrook received very
little benefit from the work that was done prior to the dismissal of this case as most of its
efforts were focused on setting aside the injunction which was awarded without notice and
without due process and unwinding the damage done to Eaglebrook. Therefore, most if not
all of the attorney fees incurred from April 1, 2005 through March 22, 2007 should be
awarded. Eaglebrook suggests the initial request of $17,358.00 plus interest from the
original Order date.
II.

EAGLEBROOK IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER THEIR ATTORNEY'S
FEES INCURRED ON APPEAL.

Eaglebrook is seeking an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. Eaglebrook is
requesting an award of attorney fees which Eaglebrook incurred as a result of the appeal filed
by PacifiCorp. Eaglebrook is also requesting an award of attorney fees on appeal which
Eaglebrook incurred as a result of the Cross-Appeal filed by Eaglebrook.
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A.

PacifiCorp argues that attorney fees on appeal should only be awarded if
the lower court awards attorney fees; however, Eaglebrook should not
only receive attorney fees on appeal if the lower court awards attorney
fees but Eaglebrook should also receive attorney fees based upon Utah
Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a) & (b) for the frivolous appeal
PacifiCorp filed and its subsequent abusive and unconscionable actions.

PacifiCorp' s behavior has been frustrating and unconscionable from the beginning and
to date continues to be evident. It is PacifiCorp who initially filed the appeal; (R. 293-295),
yet, being consistent with its pattern of abuse of procedure, it failed to meet the deadlines
required of it in submitting briefs in a timely manner. Even in the instant actions, PacifiCorp
has even continually requested extension after extension to file its opening brief. Ultimately,
it did not even meet the required deadline for sustaining its appeal. PacifiCorp's appeal was
dismissed by this court on September 18, 2007.

PacifiCorp claims that it was its

understanding that a settlement had been reached; however, that was not true. Settlement
discussions are continuing, but never has a settlement been reached. PacifiCorp's case
against Eaglebrook is still not resolved. Eaglebrook had necessarily incurred attorney fees
to protect itself against PacifiCorp's appeal and had filed a cross-claim against PacifiCorp.
Because of the outrageous behavior of PacifiCorp and the unspeakable amount of wasted
time and attorney fees expended in this matter, it is appropriate for Eaglebrook to recover its
losses under Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56, which allows attorney fees to be awarded in
cases pursued in bad faith.
In addition, Eaglebrook should be awarded attorney fees if the court remands this case
back to the lower court and the lower court awards a reasonable amount of attorney fees.
20

This is based upon the case of Utah Dept of Social Services v. Adams^ 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah
App. 1991), which states that "[t]he general rule is that when a party who received attorney
fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on
appeal." Though PacifiCorp's appeal had been dismissed because of its failure to submit its
brief to the appeals court on time, Eaglebrook felt it was important to go forward with its
counter-appeal requesting the award of reasonable attorney fees as a result of the lower court
error or abuse of discretion and for the appropriate attorneys fees incurred as a result of the
appeal. PacifiCorp should be held responsible for its abusive and unconscionable behavior.
Accordingly, Eaglebrook asks that the appeals court award reasonable attorney fees
to Eaglebrook for the fees that it incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's Appeal and
Eaglebrook's Cross-Appeal.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly found that an award of attorney fees and costs was "proper"
in dismissing PacifiCorp's action; however, the trial court committed patent error or abused
it discretion by not awarding a reasonable amount of attorney fees to Eaglebrook, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. PacifiCorp's improperly pursued an improperly formed case
when it knew service was not timely. Therefore, this court should instruct the lower court
to determine the reasonable amount of attorney fees incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's
abusive and unconscionable actions which is the subject of this appeal.
This court should also award to Eaglebrook a reasonable amount of attorney fees and
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costs which were incurred as a result of PacifiCorp's Appeal and Eaglebrook's CrossAppeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of February, 2008.

ROB GRAHAM & ASSOCIATES
By
Robert C. Graham
Nevada State Bar No. 4618
Appearing Pro Hac Vice
Michele P. Chambers
Utah State Bar No. 7481
Attorneys for Appellees/Cross-Appellant
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